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| Lang, John T.. |
| The Commission's Guidance paper on exclusionary abuse under Article 82 EC is open to three fundamental criticisms. First, it leads to less legal certainty, because the rules suggested are vague and imprecise, because dominant companies will not have the information needed to apply them, and because the Commission is trying to change the law, which it has no power to do. Second, it would lead to some anticompetitive effects, because in practice it discourages price competition, by discouraging individualised price negotiations and retroactive rebates, and by suggesting that the Commission will protect not-yet-as-efficient competitors from price competition. Third, it leads to too many "false positives", i.e., findings of exclusionary abuse that are not... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Article 82EC; Competition; Abuse; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; K21. |
| Ano: 2009 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/54282 |
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| Krakowski, Michael. |
| This paper explores the relationship between competition policy, experience of the application of competition policy, the intensity of local competition and the standard of living. Perception data from the World Economic Forum is used to measure the intensity of local competition. Richer and larger countries in general introduce competition policy earlier than smaller and poorer countries, and industrialized countries earlier than Latin American, African, transition and Asian countries, in this order. A regression analysis for a sample of 101 countries reveals that experience and overall government effectiveness explain a substantial part of the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policy. During the first years of (new) competition legislation the... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Competition Policy; Effectiveness of legal instruments; International Relations/Trade; L40; K21. |
| Ano: 2005 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/26259 |
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| Cai, Xiaowei; Stiegert, Kyle W.. |
| Understanding how business cartels form and expand is foundational for developing sound deterrence strategies. Past work (i.e. Connor, 2005) has relied on net present value (NPV) methods to evaluate the streams of costs and benefits of forming or joining a cartel. While NPV adequately measure the expected value of future streams of benefits and costs, higher moments of the distribution are also important in understanding agent behavior. Thus, in the presence of uncertainty about future streams and litigation costs, NPV may miss important dimensions that shape the issue. The decision to form or join a cartel is, at least, partially irreversible, because it exposes the firm or its involved managers to litigation on all previous returns and even after the... |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Cartel Joining Behavior; Real Options Theory; International Cartels; Industrial Organization; K21; L00; L12. |
| Ano: 2010 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/61301 |
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